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PROFOUND SOPHISTICATION OR 
LEGAL SOPHISTRY? 
EDIBERTO ROMAN,* KATRYNA SANTA CRUZ,† MELISSA GONZALEZ,‡ AND 
DIANET TORRES§ 
In the midst of growing debate and—according to widely publicized 
news accounts—growing evidence against President Donald Trump’s 
impeachment, esteemed former Harvard Law Professor and public 
intellectual, Alan Dershowitz, recently published The Case Against 
Impeaching Trump.1 In this brief, but passionate, defense of the President, 
Professor Dershowitz provides arguably the strongest legal argument against 
impeaching the Forty-Fifth President of the United States. Professor 
Dershowitz’s argument, while beautifully written, is largely a selectively 
applied textualist attempt to thwart the mounting evidence against President 
Trump and his administration. 
Dershowitz argument boils down to the following: “[I]f a president has 
not committed any of these specified crimes [those specified in the 
Constitution], it would be unconstitutional to remove him, regardless of what 
else he may have done or may do.”2 The Dershowitz defense focuses on the 
Constitution’s Impeachment Clause—Article II, Section 4—which provides: 
“The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”3 Dershowitz’s 
argument is based on the premise that because “the Constitution speaks in 
clear terms, [its] plain meaning must prevail over other considerations.”4 
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 1. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE CASE AGAINST IMPEACHING TRUMP (2018). 
 2. Id. at 1.  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
 4. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 10. 
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This argument is interesting because Dershowitz himself examines all of the 
subtle ambiguities that the Constitution’s lack of explanation creates, 
including: Can evidence be introduced? Who rules on admissibility? 
Common law? Exclusionary rule? Further, even Dershowitz recognizes the 
Constitution is missing a good deal of information on the issue of 
impeachment (in terms of Congressional trials for impeachment), but yet, 
according to Dershowitz, the Clause’s plain meaning should only allow for 
impeachment for treason and bribery.5 Seems like his reading of the 
Constitution is a little too convenient. 
According to Dershowitz’s argument, the Constitution provides the 
only basis for impeaching and removing the President of the United States, 
and in Trump’s case, there is no grounds for impeachment. The first part of 
his position—the Constitution provides the exclusive basis for 
impeachment—is uncontroversial. What is far more problematic is 
Dershowitz’s use of textualism. Dershowitz is both a self-professed 
champion of civil liberties as well as a textualist reader of the Constitution. 
Yet in this defense of Trump, the good professor fails to recognize one of the 
Constitution’s three stated grounds for impeachment, which is far from 
engaging in a textualist approach. In doing so, this champion of civil liberties 
fails to acknowledge a constitutional provision aimed at protecting the 
citizenry’s rights from tyrannical executive power. Dershowitz’s legitimate 
basis for impeachment focuses on only two of the three constitutional bases 
for impeachment: 1) treason and 2) bribery. Dershowitz’s lack of focus on a 
recognized reading of the third stated basis for impeachment is nothing short 
of perplexing especially given his textualist leaning and prior textualist 
positions. For example, he does not believe the Constitution includes privacy 
rights that protect a right to abortion because the document fails to 
specifically provide for such a right.6 
Indeed, Dershowitz’s dismissal of the Constitution’s third specifically 
stated ground for impeachment—“other high Crimes and Misdemeanors”—
is insufficiently explained in the book. This blatant omission leaves the 
reader wanting for a less partisan analysis. But before focusing on this 
shortcoming, an analysis of Dershowitz’s argument on what he views as the 
legitimate grounds for impeachment—treason and bribery—is in order.  
In terms of his first legitimate basis for impeachment, Dershowitz notes 
 
 5. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6. Sandy Fitzgerald, Alan Dershowitz: Constitution Doesn’t Guarantee Right to Abortion, 
NEWSMAX (Oct. 27, 2013), https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/dershowitz-constitution-abortion 
/2013/10/27/id/533294. 
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that only treason is defined. The Constitution defines treason as “levying 
War against [the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them 
Aid and Comfort.”7 This constitutional definition applies within 
Dershowitz’s textual approach, and is therefore a legitimate basis for 
impeachment. Though he admits that the second and third enumerated 
bases—bribery, and high crimes and misdemeanors—are not defined in the 
Constitution, it is only the high crimes and misdemeanors basis that 
Dershowitz apparently finds fatally vague and therefore is an unavailable 
basis for impeachment.8 Dershowitz apparently has less of a concern for 
bribery because it is a crime.9 Dershowitz doesn’t openly state his antipathy 
for the high crimes or misdemeanors basis for impeachment. Instead, in what 
is an overall cryptic and truncated analysis, which amounts to no more than 
thirty-two pages (including the book’s conclusion) of new materials (the 
remaining 114 pages of the book are excerpts of the professor’s previous 
editorials and interviews arguably related to his main thesis), Dershowitz 
spends the bulk of his argument addressing the purported procedural 
shortcomings of the high crimes impeachment basis— attempting to limit its 
use to crimes.10 Indeed, while Dershowitz spends virtually no time objecting 
to the bribery basis for impeachment—which he admits is not defined in the 
text of the Constitution, causing him to look to bribery’s common law 
definition—he harps on the high crimes basis, without effectively explaining 
this choice. Then instead of looking to what the drafters of the constitution 
stated concerning the high crimes or misdemeanor grounds for 
impeachment—or even looking to judicial or congressional pronouncements 
on the subject—Dershowitz shifts his focus to attacking those that advocate 
a broad interpretation of the “and other high crimes and misdemeanor” basis. 
He ultimately rejects any reading of the impeachment clause that does not 
make a crime a prerequisite to impeachment.11 As a result, he rejects 
previous interpretations by both President Ford, when he served in Congress, 
and current Congresswoman Maxine Waters; each have argued that high 
crimes and misdemeanors is whatever the house of representatives  deems 
appropriate.12 Another questionable aspect of Dershowitz’s argument 
against impeachment is his effort at equating the process of impeachment to 
the procedural requirements of a criminal trial. Yet the Impeachment Clause 
does not call for a criminal proceeding for impeachment. Instead, it provides 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.  
 8. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 3. 
 9. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at 2–3, 10. 
 10. Id. at 3–7. 
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. at 7–8. 
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for a trial by the House of Representatives, a political endeavor by definition. 
Thus, Dershowitz’s criminal law and criminal procedure-based arguments 
may very well be misplaced. While the text of the Impeachment Clause is 
far from clear on this point, interestingly, Dershowitz does not consider that 
the very placement of “and other high crimes and misdemeanor” in the list 
of impeachable acts alone strongly suggests this clause is in fact the broadest, 
or even the catch-all, basis for impeachment.13 Further, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation and basic sentence construction, the fact the broadest 
language happens to be listed last similarly suggests this basis should be read 
broadly. Indeed, such a broad reading was exactly what the framers of the 
Constitution intended. While Dershowitz, as a self-professed textualist, is no 
fan of anything other than the text of the Constitution if the text is 
unambiguous,14 it is in interpreting the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause 
where the shortcomings of his approach are highlighted. Indeed, it is here 
where textualism falls short because it utterly fails to seek or acknowledge 
what the drafters of the Constitution intended—evidently because, according 
to Dershowitz, the text is in fact unambiguous. If the text is in fact 
unambiguous, why is the debate over its language still the subject of dispute 
200 years later? Protestations to the contrary, the legislative history of the 
Impeachment Clause makes clear that the third basis for impeachment—high 
crimes and misdemeanors—was drafted and intended to be a broad catch-all 
provision. As Yale Professor Thomas I. Emerson observed: 
[T]he founding fathers did not wish to take over the English practice lock, 
stock and barrel. Impeachment was intended to be applicable only in a 
narrower set of circumstances and with more limited results. Hence, after 
some preliminary discussion, the proposal was made that the President 
could be removed from office by impeachment and conviction “for 
treason, or bribery.” This was deemed too restricted and, after rejecting 
“maladministration” as a cause for impeachment, on the ground it was too 
broad, the Convention settled on the addition of “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.” The grounds for impeachment were thus intended to be 
limited but, apart from a narrow definition of treason elsewhere in the 
Constitution, the limits were not precisely delineated.15 
Further, at the Constitutional Convention, the substitute phrase “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” was to be interpreted broadly. Madison in fact 
 
 13. Dershowitz’s attack on the “ejusdem generis” argument is peculiar. He says that that the 
argument is built on a ‘logical fallacy’ but (1) that’s absolutely untrue because this argument is based on 
the basics of grammar and (2) he doesn’t back up his point. Further, he goes on to talk about how a crime 
is needed. But we have that in Trump’s case: obstruction of justice.  
 14. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 1, at, 17. 
 15. Thomas Emerson, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 131 
(1974) (emphasis added).  
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believed that it allowed the President to be tried “for any act which might be 
called a misdemeanor.”16 Indeed, while debate remains on how broadly the 
high crimes or misdemeanors basis should be read,17 even a narrow reading 
of the clause allows for impeachment for a host of wrongs in a variety of 
settings: 
[A] standard that the framers intentionally set at this extraordinarily high 
level to ensure that only the most serious offenses and in particular those 
that subverted our system of government would justify overturning a 
popular election. Impeachment is not a remedy for private wrongs. It is a 
method of removing someone whose continued presence in office would 
cause grave danger to the Nation.18 
The weight of scholarly authority recognizes the “high Crime and 
Misdemeanors” Clause should be interpreted to address serious wrongs, but 
ultimately those wrongs can arise in a wide variety of ways.19 As one scholar 
observed, Congressional practice confirms that “high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors” is broad enough in scope to reach all misconduct that 
undermines fitness to serve.20 Professor Stephen Presser, a leading scholar 
on this constitutional provision, for instance, agreed with Gerald Ford’s 
famous suggestion that “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” means anything 
the House of Representatives wants it to mean when arguing that the 
provision reflects the essential notion that the Constitution confers broad 
discretion on the House of Representatives to make up its own mind about 
what kinds of conduct should lead to an impeachment proceeding. “[W]hile 
giving members of Congress discretion to determine whether a particular act 
or series of acts amounts to grounds for impeachment, [the Constitution] 
requires them to move forward to impeach if they determine there are such 
acts.”21 Professor Gary L. McDowell, similarly found, “[i]n the end, the 
determination of whether presidential misconduct rises to the level of ‘high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,’ as used by the Framers, is left to the discretion 
and deliberation of the House of Representatives. No small part of that 
deliberation . . . must address what effect the exercise of this extraordinary 
 
 16. John O. McGinnis, Impeachment: The Structural Understanding, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 650, 
653 (1999).  
 17. See generally Mark Slusar, Comment, The Confusion Defined: Questions and Problems of 
Process in The Aftermath of the Clinton Impeachment, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869 (1999).  
 18. Id. at 872. 
 19. See generally, e.g., Lawrence Tribe, Defining “High Crimes And Misdemeanors”: Basic 
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1999).  
 20. Id. at 712–15. 
 21. Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill Clinton Impeached?, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 666, 676 (1999). 
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constitutional sanction would have on the health of the Republic . . . .”22 
Imminent constitutional scholar, Professor Cass R. Sunstein, likewise 
observed: “[t]ext, history, and longstanding practice suggest that the notion 
of ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ should generally be understood to refer 
to large-scale abuses that involve the authority that comes from occupying a 
particular public office.”23 
Dershowitz spends no time addressing either this legislative history or 
scholarly analysis. Instead of contending with the bulk of authority on the 
matter, he employs a tried and true lawyerly tact: instead of defending a 
difficult position, it is far easier and perhaps at times more persuasive to go 
the offensive and attack the position of others that take a differing view. 
Indeed, instead of examining the case law explaining and interpreting “other 
high Crimes or Misdemeanors,” which he briefly undertakes with respect to 
the bribery cases, Dershowitz proceeds to attack “the most extreme and 
reductionist” defenses of a broad reading of the high crimes and 
misdemeanor basis.24 Yet, even under the tenets of his own textualist 
philosophy, his argument fails. Under a textualist approach, recourse to the 
‘legislative history’ or intended ‘original meaning’ is inappropriate when the 
words are unambiguous. The plain meaning under such circumstances must 
prevail over all other interpretative mechanisms, since it was the word, not 
the intentions behind them, that were voted on and accepted. But even under 
a textualist approach, if the text is ambiguous—and the high crimes and 
misdemeanor language is far from unambiguous—further inquiry is 
necessary, particularly into the Framer’s intent.25 It is here where the book’s 
analysis is weakest because Dershowitz fails to accept the value of further 
inquiry when text is ambiguous. Thus, a reader is left with a scant 
interpretation, lacking any significant legal reinforcement. 
In terms of President Trump’s potential impeachment, Dershowitz, 
somewhat unsurprisingly argues that impeachment would be inappropriate 
because the alleged wrongs purportedly committed by President Trump 
involve neither treason nor bribery—two of his legitimate enumerated 
wrongs under Article II’s Impeachment Clause.26 While Dershowitz may be 
 
 22. Gary L. McDowell, “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Recovering the Intentions of the 
Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 649 (1999).  
 23. Cass R. Sunstein, Impeachment and Stability, 67 GEO WASH. L. REV. 699, 711 (1999) 
 24. See DERSHOWITZ supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 25. See generally Linda Jellum, The Art of Statutory Interpretation: Identifying The Interpretive 
Theory of the Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims and the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 59 (2010); Elliot M. Davis, The 
Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 983 (2007). 
 26. Id. at 23–24. 
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correct that any charges or claims against President Trump may not involve 
bribery, there are growing calls arguing President Trump has in fact 
committed treason.27 Perhaps more importantly, Dershowitz’s primary 
analytical flaw is that he simply ignores the text of the Constitution, its 
interpretation in terms of legislative history, and case law on the third 
impeachable basis under Article II’s Impeachment Clause: high crimes or 
misdemeanors. 
In the end, Dershowitz attempts to largely ignore a broad reading of 
“other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” either because he may appreciate 
they provide problems for his client,28 or following his stated reasons, such 
wrongs are not defined in Article II or other parts of the Constitution and 
there are no procedural requirements set forth for convictions of such 
crimes.29 Yet his stated reasons are supported with slight authority and scant 
analysis. Dershowitz’s analysis is accordingly incomplete, thereby allowing 
the professor to accept bribery as a legitimate ground for impeachment (even 
permitting him to look to the common law, ever so briefly, on bribery), but 
in almost the same breath, he refuses to examine the legislative history of the 
Constitution, the common law, or the weight of authority on the high crimes 
or misdemeanor basis for impeachment. Any of these inquiries would have 
provided not only a more thoughtful undertaking, but also valuable guidance 
for interpreting the high crimes and misdemeanors basis for impeachment. It 
should not be forgotten, and he may himself point out, that he refuses to 
engage in an analysis that goes beyond the text’s “plain meaning.” However, 
in his own words, “‘other Crimes and Misdemeanors’ are not defined.”30 So, 
according to his own preferred interpretive approach, we should not become 
inflexible and inexplicably resort to the plain meaning when there is textual 
ambiguity in this case. Not only will case law and legislative history analysis 
provide the reader with a more thoughtful undertaking, they are essential to 
understanding the text itself. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Matthew Bell, Did Trump Commit Treason in Helsinki?, PRI (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-07-17/did-trump-commit-treason-helsinki; Grace Panetta, Former CIA 
Director John Brennan Said Trump’s Press Conference with Putin Was ‘Treasonous’ — Here’s What 
Legal Experts Say, BUS. INSIDER (July 16, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/did-trump-committ-
treason-russia-summit-2018-7; Ian Schwartz, Ralph Peters: Trump “Committed Treason” if He Got Info 
from Russians, Attacking Press Like Goebbels, REAL CLEAR POL. (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/08/01/ralph_peters_trump_committed_treason_if_he_got
_info_from_russians_attacking_press_like_goebbels.html. 
 28. Though he has repeatedly denied he represents Trump, he at least takes the position of an 
apologist for Trump.  
 29.  See DERSHOWITZ supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 30. See The Clinton Impeachments, JUSTIA: US LAW, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article 
-2/55-the-clinton-impeachment.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). 
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Ultimately, in what appears to be an apologist’s vain effort, Dershowitz 
does not address historical precedent, including the obstruction of justice 
charges brought in President Clinton’s impeachment proceedings,31 and the 
proposed charges against President Nixon,32 which were each based on “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,” and specially contained obstruction of justice 
charges (the likely charges against President Trump if impeachment is 
recommended).33 Moreover, in the four lengthy legal opinions on 
impeachment and criminal charges against a president drafted by the Justice 
Department’s Legal Office and the Office of Special Counsel in the Nixon 
impeachment effort, as well as in Clinton’s impeachment, there was no 
hesitation to accept that a president could be impeached under the “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” provision of the Impeachment Clause of Article 
II.34 Despite these historical facts, in one chapter of the book, Dershowitz 
tries to defend the President against any impending charge by arguing Trump 
cannot be charged with obstruction of justice where he was just basically 
doing what he has the power to do.35 The problem with this argument is that 
it not only disregards the law of obstruction of justice, on which there is 
extensive case-law and scholarship,36 but also that Dershowitz, as a 
champion of civil liberties, astonishingly argues for a form of executive 
supremacy that would in fact make a sitting president above the law.37 
In essence, despite the wealth of authority stating the contrary, 
Dershowitz asserts that a president can only be impeached for a crime. Yet 
 
 31. Approved Articles of Impeachment, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (presenting the text of 
the articles of impeachment against Bill Clinton). 
 32. Dan Nonicki, In 1974, Goldwater and Rhodes Told Nixon He Was Doomed, AZCENTRAL 
(Aug. 2, 2014), https://www.azcentral.com/story/azdc/2014/08/03/goldwater-rhodes-nixon-resignation 
/13497493. 
 33. Articles of Impeachment, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/impeachment/articles-of-
impeachment (last visited Oct. 23, 2018) (presenting Article 1 of the Articles of Impeachment against 
Richard Nixon adopted by the House Judiciary Committee on July 27, 1974, contain an obstruction of 
justice charge).  
 34. Charlie Savage, Newly Discovered Clinton-era Memo Says Presidents Can Be Indicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/22/us/document-Savage-NYT-
FOIA-Starr-memo-presidential.html (Appendix to the article); see also JACK MASKELL, CONG. RES. 
SERV., STATUS OF A SENATOR WHO HAS BEEN INDICTED FOR OR CONVICTED OF A FELONY (2015), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34716.pdf; A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal 
Prosecution, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/sitting-president%E2%80%99s-
amenability-indictment-and-criminal-prosecution (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).  
 35. DERSHOWITZ supra note 1, at 24. 
 36. See Ediberto Roman et al., Collusion, Obstruction of Justice, and Impeachment, 45 NOTRE 
DAME J. LEGIS. (forthcoming 2018). 
 37. DERSHOWITZ supra note 1, at 24. 
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his textual argument falls flat under its own weight—Dershowitz wants the 
interpretation of the Constitution’s Impeachment Clause to follow the 
enumerated wrongs listed in the Clause while also completely ignoring a 
specifically stated basis for impeachment that has historically and repeatedly 
been interpreted to be the broadest basis for impeachment. In the end, 
Dershowitz asserts that it would be dangerous to use a broad reading of “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” because doing so could jeopardize our system 
of government.38 How it would do so remains unclear, however. And even 
for somewhat playful arguments’ sake, if Dershowitz is correct in his 
selective reading of Article II’s Impeachment Clause, as he himself admits, 
more than one political candidate, including Professor Richard Painter, who 
is running for the U.S. Senate, has asserted that Trump’s actions amount to 
Treason.39 Dershowitz harshly criticizes Painter, saying that he “should read 
the words of the Constitution, rather than making up crimes for partisan and 
personal advantage.”40 Interestingly, Dershowitz defends his own “pure 
motives” for writing the book by noting how many individuals and even legal 
scholars have accused him of doing the very same thing: “My motives have 
also been questioned by some of my academic and political colleagues. Am 
I being paid? Am I auditioning to be Trump’s lawyer?”41 
In conclusion, Dershowitz asserts that he merely wants to focus on the 
importance of following precedent,42 arguably the most interesting assertion 
in the book. Yet in his defense of President Trump, Professor Dershowitz 
fails to examine the legal precedent on the law concerning impeachment. 
Much like his attacks on those he differs with in this book, Professor 
Dershowitz is being selectively principled with his arguments and review of 
the law. Perhaps the following best highlights a flaw in this book: it is 
evidently shameless for Painter to attack President Trump while Painter is 
running for office, but it is not shameless for Dershowitz to defend Trump 
while Dershowitz is selling books? Further, by his own admission, 
Dershowitz wants all to appreciate the importance of precedence,43 but he 
fails or refuses to address legal precedence when dismissing “high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors” as a basis for impeachment, despite said basis being 
used against both President Clinton and President Nixon.   
 
 38. DERSHOWITZ supra note 1, at 5–6.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 54. 
 42. Id. at 27. 
 43. Id. at 3. 
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